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Abstract—In order to protect privacy, Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) systems employ Privacy-Preserving 
Authentication (PPA) to allow valid readers to explicitly 
authenticate their dominated tags without leaking private 
information. Typically, an RF tag sends an encrypted message to 
the reader, then the reader searches for the key that can decrypt 
the cipher to identify the tag. Due to the large-scale deployment 
of today’s RFID systems, the key search scheme for any PPA 
requires a short response time. Previous designs construct 
balance-tree based key management structures to accelerate the 
search speed to O(logN), where N is the number of tags. Being 
efficient, such approaches are vulnerable to compromising 
attacks. By capturing a small number of tags, compromising 
attackers are able to identify other tags that have not been 
corrupted. To address this issue, we propose an Anti-
Compromising authenticaTION protocol, ACTION, which 
employs a novel sparse tree architecture, such that the key of 
every tag is independent from one another. The advantages of 
this design include: 1) resilience to the compromising attack, 2) 
reduction of key storage for tags from O(logN) to O(1), which is 
significant for resource critical tag devices, and 3) high search 
efficiency, which is O(logN), as good as the best in the previous 
designs. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Due to the low cost and easy deployment, Radio-
Frequency Identification (RFID) has been an important 
enabling technology for everyday applications, such as 
retailing, medical-patient management, access control [1], 
logistics and supply chain management [2, 3]. In RFID 
systems, RF tags emit their unique serial numbers to RF 
readers. Without privacy protection, however, any reader can 
identify a tag ID via the emitted serial number. Indeed, a 
malicious reader can easily perform bogus authentications with 
detected tags to retrieve sensitive information within its 
scanning range. Currently, many companies embed RF tags 
into items. As these tags contain unique information about the 
items, a customer carrying the tags is subject to silent tracking 
from unauthorized readers. Sensitive personal information 
might be also leaked: details about an illness inferred by the 
purchase of certain pharmaceutical products; the malls she 
shops at; the types of items she prefers to buy, and so on. 
Clearly, a secure RFID system must meet two requirements. 
First, valid readers must be able to identify valid tags. Second, 
misbehaving readers should not be able to retrieve private 
information from valid tags.   
In order to protect privacy, Privacy-Preserving 
Authentication (PPA) is introduced into the interactive 
procedure between RFID readers and tags [4]. To achieve PPA, 
an RFID tag performs a cryptography enabled challenging-
response procedure with a reader [5]. For example, we can let 
each tag share a key with the reader. During authentication, the 
reader first probes a tag via a query message with a nonce. 
Instead of answering the query in plaintext, the tag replies to 
the reader with the encrypted nonce. The reader searches all 
the keys that it holds in the back-end database. If the tag is 
valid, the reader can find a proper key to recover the 
authentication message, and thereby identify the tag. (For 
simplicity, we use the term “reader” to denote the reader 
device as well as the back-end database in the following). 
Using PPA, any invalid tag will not be accepted since it cannot 
provide a proper cipher related to a key owned by the reader. 
Meanwhile, the valid tag does not expose its identity to any 
third party in PPAs since only valid readers know the key used 
for encrypting messages. A malicious reader cannot identify a 
user via probing the valid tag. 
Although it is simple and secure, such a PPA based design 
suffers poor scalability. Upon receiving a nonce cipher, the 
reader needs a prompt lookup to locate a key in the database. 
Clearly, the search complexity is O(N), where N is the number 
of all the possible tags, even only a small portion of them are 
in the reader’s range. In today’s large-scale RFID systems, N is 
often as large as hundreds of millions, and thousands of tags 
may respond to a reader simultaneously, demanding a fast key-
search method as well as a carefully designed key-storage 
structure. Hence, balance-tree based schemes [6-9] employ 
key-sharing infrastructure to accelerate the authentication 
procedure, in which the lookup complexity is O(logN).  
The balance-tree based approaches are efficient, 
nevertheless, not secure due to the key-sharing infrastructure. 
As the infrastructure used by those approaches is static, each 
tag, more or less, shares some common keys with other tags 
(in this paper, we use normal tags to denote tags that are not 
tampered with). Consequently, compromising one tag might 
reveal information of other tags [6, 9]. L. Lu, et al evaluate the 
damage caused by the compromising attack to balance-tree 
based approaches [9]. By compromising only twenty tags, an 
adversary can achieve a nearly 100% probability of   
successfully track normal tags in a balance-tree based RFID 
system containing 2
20 tags [10].  
L. Lu, et al propose a dynamic key-updating scheme [9], 
SPA, for balance-tree base approaches to mitigate the impact 
of compromising attacks. SPA reduces the number of keys 
shared among compromised and normal tags, and alleviates 
the damage caused by compromising attacks. SPA, however, 
does not eliminate the impact of compromising attacks. For 
instance, using SPA in an RFID system with 2
20 tags, the 
probability of tracking normal tags is close to 60% after an 
adversary compromises twenty tags [9].  
Another drawback for balance-tree based PPAs is the large 
space needed for storing keys in each tag. Balance-tree based 
approaches require each tag to hold O(logδN) keys, and the 
reader to store δ × N keys, where δ is a branch factor of the key 
tree. Due to the limited memory capacity of RF tags, existing 
PPAs are difficult to apply in current RFID systems. 
In order to address the above issues, we propose an Anti-
Compromising authenticaTION protocol, called ACTION. By 
employing a sparse tree to organize keys, ACTION generates 
completely independent keys for tags, so that compromised 
tags have no keys that correlate with the normal ones. As a 
result, ACTION can effectively defend against compromising 
attacks. We show that if an attacker can track a normal tag 
with a probability larger than α, it must tamper with more than 
N – 1/α tags, while in previous balance-tree based approaches, 
by compromising O(logN) tags, an attacker can track a normal 
tag with a probability close to 100% [10]. Another salient 
feature of this design is the low storage requirement for tags. 
ACTION only allows each tag to store two keys and the reader 
to store O(N) keys, achieving high storage efficiency for both 
readers and tags, making this design practical for today’s RF 
tags. We also show that ACTION retains high search 
efficiency in the sense that the lookup complexity is still 
O(logN), as good as the best of previous designs. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss 
the related work in Section II. We present the ACTION 
protocol in Section III. In Section IV, we discuss the storage 
and search efficiency of ACTION. We present the security 
analysis in Section V, and conclude the work in Section VI. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
The fundamental principle of PPAs is based on HashLock 
[5], in which every tag shares a unique key with the reader. A 
tag and the reader use a challenging-response scheme to 
conduct authentication. Recent study [11] shows that 
HashLock is a secure PPA. The main drawback of HashLock 
is that the key search is linear to the number of tags in the 
system, which limits the usage of HashLock in large-scale 
RFID systems.  Subsequent approaches in the literature are 
mostly aimed at improving the efficiency of key search. Juels 
[12] classifies those approaches into three categories. 
Synchronization approaches: Such approaches [13-16] use 
an incremental counter to record the state of authentication. 
When an authentication is successfully performed, the tag 
increases the counter by one. The reader compares the value of 
a tag’s counter with the record in the database. If the difference 
of the two counter values is in a proper window, the tag is 
viewed as valid and the reader synchronizes the counter record 
of the tag. Synchronization schemes are subject to the 
desynchronization  attack [11], in which a malicious reader 
interrogates a tag many times such that the counter of the tag 
exceeds the range of the window and the reader fails to 
recognize a valid tag. 
Time-space tradeoff approaches: OSK [13] and AO [17] 
employ Hellman tables [18] to improve the key-efficiency. 
Hellman studies the problem of breaking symmetric keys and 
shows that an adversary can pre-compute a Hellman table of 
storage size O(N
2/3), in which the adversary can search a key 
with the complexity of O(N
2/3). That means the key-searching 
efficiency of OSK or AO is also O(N
2/3). Those approaches are 
not sufficiently efficient for supporting large-scale RFID 
systems. 
Balance-tree based approaches: Balance-tree based 
approaches [6-9] improve the key search efficiency from linear 
complexity to logarithmic complexity. They employ a balance-
tree to organize and store keys for tags. In a balance-tree, each 
node stores a unique key. Keys in the path from the root to a 
leaf node are distributed to a tag. Each tag uses these multiple 
keys to encrypt the identification message. Upon receiving an 
encrypted message, the reader performs a Depth-First Search 
on the key tree with a logarithmic complexity of the system 
size. The balance-tree based approaches, however, are subject 
to the compromising  attack [6, 9]. In a balance-tree, tags 
always share keys with others. Hence, hacking one tag may 
reveal several keys used by other tags. For example, in a 
binary balance-tree based RFID system containing 2
20 tags, an 
adversary can identify any tag with the probability of about 
90% by tampering with only twenty tags [9, 10]. To address a 
compromising attack, L. Lu, et al propose a dynamic key-
updating scheme, SPA [9], for enhancing balance-tree based 
approaches. In SPA, the reader dynamically and recursively 
updates keys in the key tree and coordinates the keys with the 
tag after a successful identification. The key-updating scheme 
reduces the probability of locating a tag via compromising 
attacks. However, the threat from compromising attacks has 
not been completely relieved. For instance, in a SPA system 
containing 2
20 tags, an adversary can still recognize any 
normal tag with a high probability (about 60%) after it tampers 
with twenty tags [9]. 
III.  ACTION DESIGN 
In this section, we first discuss the motivation of this work, 
and then present the details of the ACTION protocol. 
A.  Motivation 
In previous balance-tree based approaches, initially, a 
reader organizes a hierarchical balance-tree with a depth of 
logδN (δ is branching factor), in which each node is assigned a 
unique key. The reader then monogamously maps N leaf nodes 
to N tags. Figure 1 plots a balance-tree for eight tags. For each 
tag, there is a unique shortest path from the root to the 
corresponding leaf node. For example, in Fig. 1, the tag T3 
obtains  k1, 1,  k2, 2, and k3, 3. During authentication, upon 
receiving a request with a nonce r from the reader, T3 encrypts   
r in the way {k1, 1{r}, k2, 2{r}, k3, 3{r}} and sends the ciphers to 
the reader. Upon receiving the response from T3, the reader 
searches proper keys in the key tree to recover r. This is equal 
to exploring a path from the root to the leaf node of T3 in the 
tree. At the end of identification, if such a path exists, R 
regards  T3 as a valid tag. Clearly, the search complexity is 
O(logN). 
The fundamental nature of balance-tree based PPAs is that 
a tag shares some non-leaf nodes, more or less, with other tags 
in the key tree. This is a fatal flaw when balance-tree based 
PPAs are under the compromising attack. For example, in Fig. 
1, we can see that a common key, k1, 1, is shared by tags T1, T2, 
T3, and T4, and k2, 2 is shared by T3 and T4. If an adversary 
compromises T3 and reveals the keys stored in T3, the keys k1, 1 
and k2, 2 are also exposed. As a result, even though T4 is not 
cracked, the attacker can easily distinguish T4 via k1, 1 and k2, 2. 
Even worse, the adversary can actually distinguish each 
normal tag by only compromising a small fraction of all tags. 
Recently, L. Lu, et al propose a dynamic key-updating 
method, SPA [9], which mitigates the impact of the 
compromising attack. SPA updates a tag’s keys from the leaf 
node to the root in the key tree. Each non-leaf node uses a 
number of state bits to record the key-updating status of its 
children. The ‘old’ keys that are used by other tags will be 
stored into temporary caches. The non-leaf node automatically 
updates its own keys if all its children have updated their keys. 
Compared to non-key-updating approaches, SPA is more 
secure because it reveals fewer keys shared between a 
compromised tag and normal tags to adversaries. 
Using SPA, however, the probability that compromising 
attacks succeed [9] is still large, more than 50% in general 
cases. That is, for an RFID system containing 2
20 tags, an 
adversary only needs to compromise 20 tags before it is able to 
distinguish any tag from others with a probability larger than 
50%. The main reason is that the dependence among the keys 
of different tags is remaining. SPA reduces the number of keys 
correlating to normal tags, but the tags always share keys in 
balanced tree structure. Hence, tags are still threatened by 
compromising attacks. 
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the only 
solution to compromising attacks is to eliminate the correlation 
among the keys of different tags. Therefore, in this design, we 
intend to remove all correlations among the keys. The 
difficulty is that we cannot sacrifice the search efficiency as 
well as the storage efficiency. 
B.  Overview 
ACTION has four components: system initialization, tag 
identification, key-updating, and system maintenance. In the 
first component, instead of using a balance-tree, we employ a 
sparse tree to organize keys for tags. We generate two random 
keys (128 bits) for each tag, denoted as leaf key k
l, and path 
key k
p, respectively. The k
p is corresponding to a path in the 
sparse tree according to its value. Each tag is associated with a 
leaf node in the tree after the key initialization. The leaf node 
thereby holds the key k
l assigned to the tag, and the path from 
the root to the leaf node indicates the key k
p. Since the two 
keys are randomly generated, keys among different tags are 
independent. In the second component, the reader performs a 
logarithmic search to identify a tag. In the third component, 
ACTION performs a key-updating procedure, in which 
ACTION employs a cryptographic hash function, such as 
MD5, SHA-1, to update the old key in a tag. Note that the new 
key is still random and independent of the keys used by other 
tags. ACTION also reduces the maintenance overheads in 
highly dynamic systems where tags join or leave frequently by 
using the fourth component. 
C.  System Initialization 
We assume that there are N tags Ti,  N i ≤ ≤ 1 , and a reader 
R in the RFID system. We denote the sparse tree used in 
ACTION as S. Let δ denote the branching factor of the key 
tree and d denote the depth of the tree. Each tag is associated 
with a leaf node in S. The secret keys shared by tag Ti and 
reader R are denoted as ki
p and ki
l. Let n be the length of ki
p
 and 
ki
l, i.e. |ki
p| = |ki
l| = n. We split ki
p into d  parts as 
ki
p[0]||ki
p[1]||…||ki
p[d-1] (‘||’ denotes concatenation), and the 
length of each ki
p[m]
  is  n/d,  01 md ≤≤−. We set the 
branching factor, δ, of each non-leaf node in S as 2
n/d, namely 
d×logδ = n. For example, if we set the key length as 128 bits 
and d = 32, the branching factor of the S is δ = 2
128/32 = 2
4 = 16. 
In other words, each non-leaf node is able to accommodate 16 
child positions in S. If the c-th child node exists in a child 
position of a non-leaf node j, we set c as the index number of 
this child and record c in j. Note that a non-leaf node only 
stores the index numbers for existing children. 
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Figure 1. An example of key organization in balance-tree based PPAs. 
 
Figure 2. A key tree with four tags (N = 4).   
For simplicity, we denote the set of j’s index numbers as 
ISj, and the element number of ISj as INj, that is, INj = |ISj|. We 
show an example in Fig. 2, in which the branching factor δ is 
2
4. Each non-leaf node has sixteen child positions. For a non-
leaf node a, as shown in Fig. 2, the reader maintains its’ index 
number set as ISa = {5, 7}, and the INa=2. 
Initially, the tree is empty. Reader R generates two keys ki
p 
and ki
l uniformly at random for every tag Ti. Meanwhile, the 
reader divides each ki
p into d parts, ki
p[0]||ki
p[1]||…||ki
p[d-1], 
where d is the depth of key tree S. The reader distributes ki
p 
and ki
l to tag Ti and organizes ki
p into S as follows. From the 
root, the reader generates a non-leaf node at each level m 
according to the corresponding ki
p[m]. Specifically, after 
generating a node a at the level m-1 according to the ki
p[m-1], 
the reader will generate the ki
p[m]-th child of node a, and set an 
index number of a as ki
p[m]. For the example shown in Fig. 2, 
the branching factor δ of S is 16, and there are four tags in the 
system, denoted as T1, T2, T3, and T4. Assume that the length of 
path key is twelve bits. Each path key is divided into three 
parts, and the length of each part is four bits (because δ = 16, 
the length of each part of a key should be log216 = 4 bits). The 
reader generates four path keys as 257, 277, 468, and 354 for 
tags  T1-T4, respectively. The reader also generates four leaf 
keys as k1
l, k2
l, k3
l, and k4
l for T1-T4, respectively. For T1, k1
p = 
257 (0010||0101||0111), thus, k1
p[0] = 2, k1
p[1] = 5, and k1
p[2] = 
7. The reader first generates a child at the root, and sets an 
index number as 2 (k1
p[0] = 2). Here the index number 2 
means the root has a child marked as node a in its second 
position, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Then the reader generates a 
child b of node a, and sets an index number of a as 5 (k1
p[1] = 
5). Finally, the reader generates a child c of node b, which is a 
leaf node c, and sets an index number of b as 7 (k1
p[2] = 7). 
Indeed, the key organization is analogous to generating a path 
in tree S. In the above example, the path of T1 is 
root→a→b→c. After the same procedures on tags T2, T3, and 
T4, we obtain a sparse tree as illustrated in Fig. 2. The 
procedure is described in Algorithm 1 TagJoin. 
D.  Tag Identification 
ACTION employs cryptographic hash functions to 
generate authentication messages and update keys. Let h 
denote a cryptographic hash function: h:{0,1}
*→{0,1}
n, where 
n denotes the length of the hash value. Let N be the number of 
all tags in the system. The basic authentication procedure 
between the reader and a tag Ti ( N i ≤ ≤ 1 ) includes three 
phases, as illustrated in Fig. 3. In the first phase, the reader R 
sends a “Request” with a random number r1 (a nonce) to tag Ti. 
In the second phase, upon receiving “Request”, tag Ti 
generates a random number r2 (a nonce) and calculates a series 
of hash values, h(r1, r2, ki
p[0]), h(r1, r2, ki
p[1]), ..., h(r1, r2, ki
p[d-
1]), h(r1, r2, ki
l), where h(r1, r2, k) denotes the output of the 
hash function on three inputs: a key k and two random 
numbers r1 and r2. Ti replies R with a message U = (r2, h(r1, r2, 
ki
p[0]), h(r1, r2, ki
p[1]), ..., h(r1, r2, ki
p[d-1]), h(r1, r2, ki
l)). For 
simplicity, we denote the elements in U as u, v0, v1, …, vd-1,vd 
where u = r2 and vj = h(r1, r2, ki 
j), j = 0...d-1, vd = h(r1, r2, ki
l). 
In the third phase, R identifies Ti using the key tree S and the 
received U. 
Reader R invokes a recursive algorithm to probe a path 
from the root to a leaf in S to identify Ti as shown in Algorithm 
2. Assume R reaches a non-leaf node a at level m-1. For all 
index numbers stored in a, R computes the hash values with 
inputs r1, r2, and the index numbers. R then compares the hash 
values with the element vm in the received U. If there is a 
match, the path of Ti should be extended to the child related to 
the index number. Note that here the child node is on the path 
assigned to Ti. Repeating such a procedure until arriving at a 
leaf node, R recognizes the tag Ti. For the example shown in 
Fig. 2, upon receiving a “Request” message with a random r1, 
T1 generates a random number r2, and computes a series of 
hash values h(r1, r2, 2), h(r1, r2, 5), h(r1, r2, 7), and h(r1, r2, k1
l), 
then replies R with the message U = (u, v0, v1, v2) = (r2, h(r1, r2, 
2), h(r1, r2, 5), h(r1, r2, 7), h(r1, r2, k1
l)). After receiving U, R 
computes all h(r1, r2, x) to compare with v1. Here x = 2, 5, and 
7, which are all the index numbers stored in the root. Clearly, 
R locates 2 as a match number and thereby moves to node a. 
Then R locates 5 and 7 in the nodes b and node c, respectively. 
R terminates its path probing when it reaches the leaf node c, 
and hence identifying T1. 
E.  Key-Updating 
After successfully identifying Ti,  R and Ti automatically 
update the key stored in Ti and coordinate the changes to the 
tree S as follows. 
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Figure 3. The authentication procedure of ACTION. 
Algorithm 1: TagJoin (Tag T, Key Tree S) 
1:    k
p, k
l ← KeyGeneration(T); 
2:    (k
p[0],…, k
p[d-1]) ← KeyDivision(k
p); 
3:    Node ← GetRoot(S); 
4:    for i = 0 to d – 1 
5: Add  k
p[i]into Node’s Index Set IS;  
6:             if  the k
p[i]-th child does not exist 
7:                      Create the k
p[i]-th child; 
8:                      Node ← the k
p[i]-th child; 
9:             else  Node ← the k
p[i]-th child; 
 
Algorithm 2: Identification (U, node X) 
  1:    SUCCEED ← false; 
  2:    m ← DepthOfNode(X); 
  3:    IS ← GetIndexSet(X); 
  4:    IN ← |IS|; 
  5:    if m ≠ d  
  6:          for i = 1 to IN 
  7:               if vm = h(r1, r2, i)∧ i ∈ IS  
  8:                     Y ← GetChild(X,i); 
  9:                     Identification (U, Y); 
10:    else if m = d∧h(r1,r2, kl) = vd 
11:          SUCCEED ← true; 
12:    if (SUCCEED = false) 
13:          Fail and output 0; 
14:    Accept and output 1;   
Algorithm 3: TagLeave (Tag T, Key Tree S) 
  1:    k
p, k
l ← GetKey(T); 
  2:    (k
p[0],…, k
p[d-1]) ← KeyDivision(k
p); 
  3:    Node ← GetLeaf(T);\\ Get the corresponding leaf node of T 
  4:    for i = d – 1 to 0 
  5:          if  Node doesn’t have brothers 
  6:                   TempNode ← Node;  
  7:                   Node ← FindParent(TempNode); 
  8:                   Delete the ki from the Index Set IS of Node; 
  9:                   Delete TempNode; 
10:          else Node←FindParent(Node); 
R makes use of a cryptographic hash function h to generate 
new keys. Let ki
p and ki
l be the current path key and leaf key 
used by Ti. R computes a new path key 
p
i k from the old path 
key ki
p and leaf key ki
l by computing 
p
i k=  h (r1, r2, ki
p, ki
l). 
Similarly, R calculates the new leaf key as  l
i k=  h (r1, r2, ki
l). 
The challenging issue here is that we need to carefully modify 
the index numbers of non-leaf nodes according to the new 
key p
i k . Otherwise, some tag identifications can be 
interrupted, since the index number stored in non-leaf nodes 
might be shared among multiple tags. 
To address the challenge, we design two algorithms for 
key-updating: TagJoin shown in Algorithm 1 and TagLeave 
shown in Algorithm 3. The basic idea is that we first use the 
TagLeave to remove the path corresponding to old path key ki
p 
of tag Ti, and then generate a new path corresponding to key 
p
i k  in S. It is possible that a non-leaf node in the path has 
multiple branches so that some keys are used by other tags, for 
example, node a in Fig. 2. In this case, the TagLeave algorithm 
terminates. 
After deleting the old key, R re-generates a new path for 
tag  Ti according to the new key  p
i k using the TagJoin 
algorithm. A potential problem of new path generation is that 
the path has existed in S, which means the key  p
i k has been 
generated in the system. The probability of this situation 
happening is quite small. First, the sparse tree is a virtual tree 
according to the initialization algorithm. Prior to the tag 
deployment, the tree is empty. When a path key is generated 
by a hash function, a path from a certain leaf to the root 
emerges accordingly in the sparse tree. Therefore, a path in the 
sparse tree corresponds to a hash value. This correspondence 
leads to two facts: 1) the capability of a sparse tree is as large 
as the size of the hash value space. In our work, a path key is a 
hash value with a length of 128 bits, which indicates the sparse 
tree can hold 2
128 paths at its maximum, that is, the sparse tree 
can hold 2
128 tags correspondingly. In any practical RFID 
system, however, the number of tags is much less than 2
128. 
The probability that the tree becomes dense is negligible. 2) A 
path in the sparse tree corresponds to a hash value. Therefore, 
if two tags have the same path in the sparse tree, a hash 
collision appears. According to the collision-resistance 
property of hash functions, the probability of a hash collision 
happening is also negligible. For example, an RFID system 
contains 2
20 tags, and the length of a path key is 128 bits. The 
ratio of occupied paths in the sparse tree is 2
-88 (2
20/2
128), and 
the path key is generated uniformly at random. Thus, the 
probability of generating an existing path is 2
-88. It is safe to 
claim that the probability of two tags having a similar path is 
negligible based on the above analysis. 
If such a collision does happen, in this design, R first 
generates a new key ) , , , ( 2 1
2
l
i
p
i
p
i k k r r h k = , and then executes 
the TagJoin algorithm again to create a new path in S.  R 
repeats such a procedure until a new path is successfully 
generated. R counts the number that TagJoin runs, denoted as s 
(due to the negligible probability of collisions, s usually equals 
to 1), and sends a synchronization message σ = (s,  h(r1, r2, 
s
p
i k ), h(r1, r2,  l
i k )) to tag Ti, as shown in Fig. 3. Here 
s
p
i k  is 
computed from iterative equations by: 
⎪ ⎩
⎪
⎨
⎧
=
=
−
) , , , (
1
2 1
1
l
i
s
p
i
s
p
i
p
i
p
i
k k r r h k
k k                   (1) 
Having σ, Ti can coordinate its key with the one generated 
by the reader. Ti first computes 
s
p
i k  using  ki
p and s with 
equation (1), then computes  l
i k=  h (r1, r2, ki
l). Thus, Ti gets σ’ 
= (s, h(r1, r2, 
s
p
i k ), h(r1, r2,  l
i k )). After computing σ and σ’, Ti 
verifies whether σ is identical to σ’. If yes, Ti updates its keys 
as 
s
p
i k and  l
i k   to finish the synchronization. Otherwise, Ti 
returns an error to the user.  
F.  System Maintenance 
This component is mainly for tag joining and leaving. If a 
new tag Ti joins the system, R needs to find a new path in the 
key tree by invoking the TagJoin algorithm. In detail, R 
generates a new path key ki
p and leaf key ki
l independent to 
other keys, then splits ki
p into d parts, ki
p[0], ki
p[1],…, ki
p[d-1]. 
Starting from the root, R constructs the path downwards. If R 
arrives at a non-leaf node j at level m, R adds ki
p[m] into j’s 
index number set ISj, and walks to the ki
p[m]-th child of j (if 
this child does not exist, R creates it). When a leaf node is 
reached, R associates Ti to the leaf node, and sets the key of the 
leaf node as ki
l. A new path is generated for Ti. 
To withdraw a tag Ti, R should erase the path from the root 
to Ti’s associated leaf node by using the TagLeave algorithm. 
Starting from the associated leaf node of Ti,  R removes the 
path upwards. At the beginning, R deletes the leaf key ki
l of Ti. 
If R reaches a node e at level m, R first finds e’s parent f, and 
then deletes ki
p[m] from the index set ISf. After arriving at node 
f, R deletes e. R repeats this procedure until a non-leaf node in 
the path has multiple branches, for example, node a in Fig. 2. 
Thus, R withdraws Ti.   
IV.  EFFICIENCY  
We first investigate the storage efficiency of ACTION, and 
then analyze the identification efficiency by estimating the 
necessary number of hash computations. We also discuss the 
lower and upper bounds of ACTION’s identification 
efficiency. 
A.  Storage 
An RFID tag normally has a very tiny memory for storing 
user information as well as the keys. Hence, storage efficiency 
must be taken into account in designing secure PPA protocols. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that keys used by 
PPA protocols have an identical length, for example 64 bits, 
for security consideration. In balance-tree based approaches, 
each tag is allocated multiple keys, which incur a relatively 
large storage overhead. ACTION is more efficient in the key 
storage on both the tag and reader sides. On the tag side, 
ACTION allocates each tag only two keys, a path key and a 
leaf key. On the reader side, each path key is divided into 
several fractions and stored in the non-leaf nodes’ index sets. 
Thus, R only stores 2N keys. In contrast, balance-tree based 
approaches distribute O(logδN) keys to each tag, and maintain 
δ × N keys on the reader side, where δ is the branching factor 
of the balance key tree. Therefore, ACTION is more practical 
for current RFID systems. 
B.  Identification Efficiency 
The basic operations in a PPA authentication are hash 
computations and comparisons. The numbers of these two 
operations are equal, because each hash computation is 
followed by a comparison of hash values.  Hence, we use the 
number of hash computations to estimate the time complexity. 
We present the best and worst cases in ACTION’s 
authentication procedure, which are the computational lower 
bound and upper bound, respectively. 
In the best case, the reader always meets a non-leaf node 
with only one index number at each level in the key tree. After 
d steps probing, the reader successfully identifies a tag. With 
the same branching factor setting δ, the depth of sparse tree is 
larger than the balance-tree, that is, d > logδN. Therefore, the 
computational lower bound of ACTION’s identification is 
logδN. 
As we assume the branching factor of the key tree is δ, 
each non-leaf node has at most δ children. In the worst case, at 
the root, the reader will compute δ hash values, and narrow the 
search scope to N/δ tags; at a child node of the root, the reader 
performs δ hash computations again. Then the reader narrows 
the search scope to N/δ
2 tags. At each level, the reader 
conducts δ  hash computations. The reader repeats the same 
process at each level. At a given level l, the reader narrows the 
search scope to N/δ
l tags, and performs l·δ hash computations. 
We assume at level l, the reader finds N/δ
l = 1, or l = logδN. 
Since d > logδN, the reader does not reach leaf nodes at level l. 
We assume that the reader reaches a non-leaf node a at level l. 
The node a must have only one child (if a has two children, the 
number of tags in the system must be N+1, not N). Similar to 
a, each node of a’s offspring has only one child. Thus, the 
reader will perform d – l hash computations below the level l. 
We illustrate the worst case in Fig. 4. 
We calculate hash computations in the worst case, f(δ) = δ 
× l + d – l. Since l = logδN, and d = n/logδ (see Section III. C). 
We get 
δ
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δ
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                 (2) 
In equation (2), n is the bit length of keys in the system; in 
ACTION,  n = 128. Let EACTION denote the efficiency of 
identification. We get 
δ
δ δ δ log
log ) 1 ( log
n
N E N ACTION + ⋅ − ≤ <  
Thus,  EACTION is O(logδN). We plot the curve of the 
efficiency upper bound f(δ) in Fig. 5. 
To find the optimal δ, we set f’(δ) = 0. We get 
δ δ δ
δ
δ 2 log ) 1 ) 1 (ln (
ln log
log
+ −
=
e n
N                       (3) 
By solving equation (3), we find that δ = 8 is the optimal 
setup for identification efficiency. The upper bound 
is 3 3
7 log ) 8 ( n N f + = . According to the relation between δ and 
d, if δ = 8, then d = 128/(log 8) = 128/3. By that setup, d is not 
an integer. Hence, in ACTION, we set a sub-optimal δ = 16, 
such that d = 32. The upper bound is 4 4
15 log ) 16 ( n N f + = . 
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Figure 4. The  worst case of ACTION. 
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Figure 5. Efficiency upper bound vs. branching factor. (Assume N = 2
20, n = 
128)   
Combined with the early discussion, we can see that the time 
complexity of ACTION authentication is O(logN). 
V.  SECURITY ANALYSIS 
The essential goal of ACTION is to protect the privacy and 
defend against both passive and active attacks. These attacks 
are always the most important concerns in wireless 
environments [20-22]. For RFID systems, passive attack often 
means eavesdropping on the communication between tag T 
and reader R, which are intensively discussed in previous 
designs [5-10, 11-17]. Active attackers can forge, replay, or 
discard the messages exchanged between T and R, so the 
attacks include tracking, cloning, and tag-compromising [7, 
19]. Attackers are even able to execute bogus authentication 
procedures. As ACTION has most of the advantages of early 
designs, it is inherently able to defend against passive attacks. 
Hence, in this section, we focus more on the ACTION’s 
resistance to the compromising attack, which is the most 
serious threat to RFID systems but not addressed by early 
studies. 
A.  Compromising Attack 
We present an attack model to formalize the capability of 
adversaries based on Avoine’s [19] model. We create an 
interactive game G for two participants: an adversary A (the 
attacker) and a challenger C (the RFID system). Any attack to 
the RFID system can be represented as A’s querying on one of 
C’s oracles as follows:  
Query(T, m1, m3): A sends a request m1 to T. Subsequently, 
A receives a response from T. R then sends the message m3 to 
T. Note that m1 and m3 represent the messages sent from A in 
the first and third rounds in an ACTION authentication 
procedure, respectively. 
Send(R, m2): A sends a message m2 to R and receives a 
response. Note that m2 represents the message sent from A in 
the second round in an ACTION authentication procedure. 
Execution(T,  R):  A acts as a man-in-the-middle and 
executes an instance of the authentication protocol P with T 
and  R, respectively. A then modifies the response messages 
and relays them to both sides accordingly. 
Reveal(T): A compromises T, which means A obtains T’s 
keys. Note that A can distinguish any given tag T from other 
tags if it can obtain T’s keys. 
Based on these oracles, the detailed procedure of game G 
between A and C consists of the following steps.  
1. A interacts with C by accessing the above four oracles in 
polynomial time. In fact, adversary A performs a learning 
procedure on the system.  
2. A informs C that the game has begun. C chooses two 
normal tags T0 and T1.  
3. Let 
0 T O  and 
1 T O denote the sets of accessed oracles of T0 
and T1, respectively. For T0 and T1, A accesses their oracles 
in
0 T O  and 
1 T O . 
4.  C first accesses 
0 T O  and 
1 T O , and then selects a bit 
} 1 , 0 { ∈ b  uniformly at random. C then provides the oracles of 
the corresponding tag Tb (if b=0, Tb =T0, otherwise Tb=T1) to A 
for access. For simplicity, we denote Tb as T. A then accesses 
T’s oracle (except the Reveal oracle). Let the set of accessed 
oracles of T be OT.  
5. Based on the results from
0 T O ,
1 T O , and OT, A outputs a 
bit  b’. If b’=b,  A successfully distinguishes T0 and T1; 
otherwise, A loses. Note that A can access the oracles in 
0 T O , 
1 T O and  T O  in polynomial time. Since T0 and T1 are chosen 
uniformly at random from all normal tags, if A can distinguish 
T0 from T1 (or vice versa) successfully with a probability non-
negligibly larger than 1/2, this means that A can track all tags 
in an RFID system. Otherwise, we call that such an RFID 
system is private under the compromising attack. 
Definition 1. A protocol P is private under the 
compromising attack, if for any polynomial time adversary A, 
the probability of A guessing b successfully under the above 
attack model satisfies:  
1
2 Pr[ ' ] 1/ ( ) b b poly s =≤ + . 
Where poly(s) are arbitrary polynomials, and s is a security 
parameter.   
Based on Definition 1, for a given PPA based protocol P, 
we define the advantage of a compromising adversary by 
2
1 ] ' Pr[ ) ( Adv − = = b b A P  
The advantage is a measurement of how successful an 
adversary can distinguish a tag from others. In our model, we 
assume that only two tags are normal and all other tags have 
been compromised. In this case, if the adversary can 
distinguish a normal tag from another one with a probability 
larger than 1/2, by using the obtained keys from compromised 
tags, we claim that the adversary has the advantage, and the 
value is determined by the difference between the probability 
and 1/2. 
B.  Defending Against Compromising Attacks 
Based on the model, we formally prove that ACTION 
protocol is private under the compromising  attack, which 
means an adversary has a negligible advantage when it 
conducts compromising attacks on the ACTION.  
Theorem 1. Let qQ, qS, and qE be the number of queries to 
the Query, Send and Execute oracles, respectively. ACTION is 
private under the compromising attack, and the advantage of a 
compromising adversary A is bounded by  
1
2
ACTION
2
)) ( 4 ) )( 1 ((
) ( Adv
+
+ + + +
≤
n
S E E Q q q q q d
A , 
even if all other tags, except T0 and T1, in the system have been 
compromised by A, where d is the number of the key parts (or 
the depth of the key tree), and n is the bits number of a hash 
value as aforementioned in Section III. C.  
Proof: In this proof, we use the random oracle (RO) model 
[23], in which hash functions are treated as arbitrary random 
functions. Since all keys in ACTION are generated 
independently, the keys of a tag are not related to those in 
other tags. We denote the game between the challenger C and 
the adversary A as G0.    
We introduce another challenger C’, (who plays a 
simulated game G1 with the adversary A), to simulate the real 
challenger  C, and make them indistinguishable to A. Thus, 
from the viewpoint of A, the game G1 between A and C’ 
simulates exactly the real game G0 between A and the real 
challenger C. On the other hand, we construct C’ without the 
knowledge of T0 and T1’s secret keys, k0 and k1. Thus, there is 
no information about k0 and k1 leaked to adversary A, so that A 
must randomly guess which tag T0 or T1 is, that is, guessing the 
bit b (see the step 5 of the attack model in Section V. A) at 
random. In this case, the probability of a correct guess is 1/2. 
According to the definition of the compromising attack (refer 
to Section V. A), A’s advantage in G1 is 0. G1 almost perfectly 
simulates the real game G0, so the activities of the challenger 
C’ would also perfectly simulate the real challenger C. 
However, without the knowledge of T0 and T1’s secret key, 
there are some differences, called Exceptions, between the 
activities of C’ and C in some situations. If we can estimate the 
probability of the Exception happening, we can compute the 
upper bound of A’s advantage.  
In G1, the challenger C’ simulates the hash function h in 
ACTION as a RO h’. The h’ is constructed as a hash value list, 
H_list, maintained by C’. H_list is initialized as empty. The 
format of each item in H_list is (r1, r2, k, v), where v is the hash 
value of r1, r2, and k, i.e. v = h(r1, r2, k). 
For a query (r1, r2, k): If it exists in H_list, C’ returns the 
corresponding  v = h(r1,  r2,  k); Otherwise C’ picks up a v 
uniformly at random, returns the v as the answer of h(r1, r2, k), 
and adds (r1, r2, k, v) into the  H_list.   
In the real game G0, each message is computed with the 
hash function; the outputs of oracles Query, Send, and Execute 
are also computed with the hash function. Thus, we use the h’ 
given above to construct the Query, Send, and Execute oracles 
in the G1.  
According to the ACTION protocol, the inputs of the 
Query oracle are “Request” and a nonce r1, and the outputs are 
the authentication messages U = (r2, h(r1, r2, ki
p[0]), h(r1, r2, 
ki
p[1]),…, h(r1, r2, ki
p[d-1])). In G1, the challenger C’ simulates 
the Query oracle as follows:  
Upon receiving the “Request” and r1, the challenger C’ 
first generates a nonce r2 and two n-bits long keys k
p and k
l 
uniformly at random respectively,  and then divides k
p into d 
parts, k
p[0],  k
p[1],…,  k
p[d-1]. Next, C’ accesses the random 
oracle h’ for d times to get the hash value sequence h(r1, r2, 
k
p[0]),  h(r1,  r2,  k
p[1]),…,  h(r1,  r2,  k
p[d-1]). Later on, C’ 
computes the hash value h(r1, r2, k
l) by accesses h’. Finaly, C’ 
returns U = (r2, h(r1, r2, k
p[0]), h(r1, r2, k
p[1]),…, h(r1, r2, k
p[d-
1]), h(r1, r2, k
l)). 
Similarly, C’ simulates the Send oracle in G1 as follows: 
Upon U = (r2, h(r1, r2, ki
p[0]), h(r1, r2, ki
p[1]),…, h(r1, r2, 
ki
p[d-1]), h(r1, r2, ki
l)): Generates a nonce r1, a path key k
p, and 
a leaf key k
l uniformly at random; Accesses the random oracle 
h’ to get the hash value h(r1,  r2,  k
p,  k
l) and h(r1,  r2,  k
l); 
Accesses the random oracle h’ to get the hash value h(r1, r2, 
h(r1, r2, k
p)) and h(r1, r2, h(r1, r2, k
l)). Returns σ = (1, h(r1, r2, 
h(r1, r2, k)), h(r1, r2, h(r1, r2, k
l))) (where 1 is the value of s, the 
number of TagJoin algorithm running; see Section III. E). 
Based on the Query and Send oracles, C’ constructs the 
Execute oracle. Note that according to the definition of the 
Execute oracle, adversary A acts as a man-in-middle attacker 
between reader R and tag T. Therefore, in the procedure of 
performing  Execute oracle, there are two stages: A 
communicates with T, which can be abstracted as Query 
oracle, and A communicates with R, which can be abstracted as 
Send oracle. Hence, the Execute oracle can be considered as 
the combination of Query and Send oracles. An access to 
Execute can also be regarded as an access to Query oracle plus 
an access to Send oracle. We thereby treat qE Execute queries 
as qE Query and qE Send oracle accesses, respectively.  
G1 is same as G0, except the constructions of the Query, 
Send and Execute oracles. In G1, from the viewpoint of A, C’ 
simulates  C perfectly except one event happens: a hash 
collision occurs in the output of the hash function. When the 
RO  h’ receives (r1,  r2,  k) and (r2,  r1,  k) as inputs, the two 
outputs should be identical in G0. In G1, however, the outputs 
of h’ would not be identical. Thus, C’ cannot answer A’s query 
correctly. We define such a situation as an Exception. The 
probability of an Exception happening is bounded by the 
birthday paradox:  
n
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Note that the (d+1)(qE+qQ) denotes the number of accesses 
to  h’. Those accesses to h’  are generated by qE+qQ  Query 
oracle accesses, and each Query oracle access includes d+1 
accesses to h’. Since in each Send oracle access, there are four 
accesses to h’, the number of accesses to h’ in accessing the 
Send oracle is 4(qE+qS), where n is the number of bits of a 
hash value, and d is the number of the divided parts of each 
tag’s key.  
As discussed at the beginning of the proof, the advantage 
of A in G1 is zero. Therefore, considering the probability of 
Event happens, the advantage of the compromising adversary 
is bounded by: 
1
2
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Based on the Definition 1, ACTION is private under the 
compromising attack. Proved.■ 
Theorem 1 states that, under the attack model defined in 
Section V. A, the advantage of compromising attackers is 
negligible. Since qE,  qQ, and qS are polynomial to n, the 
advantage of compromising attackers approximates 0. That is, 
in the extreme case, even if a compromising attacker has 
captured N – 2 tags, the probability of distinguishing a normal 
tag from another one is still 1/2. In general, assume the 
attacker has tampered with t tags. To distinguish a normal tag, 
the attacker has to perform random guessing on N – t normal 
tags, and the probability of correctly guessing, so the 
probability of a successful attack is 1/(N – t).  
We compare the successful probabilities of compromising 
attacks in balance-tree based approaches, SPA, and ACTION. 
In this comparison, we assume SPA and balance-tree based 
approaches use binary trees. The RFID system contains 2
20 
tags. As shown in Fig. 6, in SPA and other balance-tree based   
approaches, compromising attackers have an overwhelming 
probability of distinguishing any normal tag after they tamper 
with 10 tags in the system, while ACTION perfectly eliminates 
the impact of compromising attacks. 
We note that the path key of a tag may suffer from the key 
extracting attack. In ACTION, we set the branching factor as 
16 when the length of a path key is 128-bits long. The path key 
will be divided into thirty-two 4-bit parts with this setting. In 
this case, for any identification message h(r1,  r2,  ki
p[j]), an 
adversary can easily extract ki
p[j] by enumerating all 4-bit 
strings, like a brute-force search. Repeating the enumeration, 
the adversary can retrieve the entire path key. To fix this flaw, 
we introduce a leaf key ki
l in the path key updating procedure. 
The length of each leaf key is similar to that of the path key, 
that is, 128 bits in our protocol. After identification, the path 
key is updated by h(r1, r2, ki
p, ki
l) and the key ki
l is also updated 
accordingly in each key updating procedure. Without knowing 
the leaf key, the adversary cannot predict the updated path key 
by guessing or performing a brute-force-like search on its sub-
parts. Thus, ACTION can be resilient to an extracting attack. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
We propose a PPA protocol, ACTION, to support secure 
and efficient authentication in RFID applications. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first work that is able to defend 
against a compromising attack using tree-based approaches. 
The advantages of this design also include high efficiency in 
terms of storage and identification. We believe wide 
deployment of this design will make PPAs more practical and 
effective for large-scale RFID systems. 
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Figure 6. Comparisons on defending against the compromising attack 
(Assume N = 2
20). 